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*Conv. 221 In his valuable commentary on Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services Ltd v.
Sabherwal 1 Mr Martin Dixon has sought to dispose of what he calls “the Ferris/Battersby effect”, i.e.
the argument that the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA) has, no doubt
inadvertently, overruled City of London Building Society v. Flegg 2 in relation to dispositions of
registered land made in breach of trust. We are flattered, of course, to have an “effect” named after
us, but to a large extent we would wish to disclaim paternity. In our original article3 we sought to
analyse the provisions of TOLATA and to elucidate its structure, building on the work that Mr Charles
Harpum had done on the pre-1997 law.4 Mr Harpum showed that overreaching depends on the valid
exercise of a dispositive power; a disposition outside such a power (which Mr Harpum called ultra
vires ) would not overreach. In our article, we sought to apply that insight to the changed structure of
trusts of land brought into being by Part 1 of TOLATA. Our concern has been to analyse the new law
at a structural level, and therefore it is not any supposed “Ferris/Battersby effect” but the effect of
TOLATA that is in issue.
Mr Dixon clearly starts out with a desire to defend the continuing integrity of Flegg, and in his note he
advances the view that section 18 of the Land Registration Act 1925 has a role to play in granting
powers to trustees of land.5 The fact is, however, that the House of Lords in Flegg put forward two
lines of reasoning concerning the nature of overreaching. One line of *Conv. 222 reasoning linked
overreaching in the case of a trust for sale (the relevant case on the facts of Flegg ) to the doctrine of
conversion.6 We agree with Robert Walker L.J. in the Birmingham Midshires case that the abolition of
the doctrine of conversion has had no impact on the operation of overreaching.7 The operative
reasoning in Flegg must therefore be the other line, which relied on the effects of the powers granted
to trustees for sale by the 1925 property legislation.8 That line of reasoning took no account of section
18 of the Land Registration Act 1925. The crucial section was section 28 of the Law of Property Act
1925, and the reasoning of the House of Lords is applicable to both unregistered and registered land.
When, therefore, Mr Dixon resorts to section 18 of the Land Registration Act 1925 to explain the
operation of overreaching in registered land, he departs from any possible ratio decidendi of Flegg.
On that view, the reasoning in Flegg is therefore flawed. Mr Harpum reached the conclusion that
Flegg was decided per incuriam in failing to rely on section 18.9 Yet section 18 was cited to the House
in argument,10 and was expressly referred to by Lord Templeman in his speech.11 In upholding Flegg,
therefore, Mr Dixon is forced to conclude that it was correctly decided but for the wrong reasons. We
would argue, to the contrary, that Flegg was correct in refusing to give section 18 a crucial role in the
operation of overreaching in registered conveyancing. Further, the reasoning may be seen as, sub
silentio, supporting our argument that section 18 (and similar provisions in the Land Registration Act
1925, e.g. section 25) are concerned with the ability of any registered proprietor to enter into
dispositions and create charges, not with the authority of *Conv. 223 registered proprietors who are
trustees.12 That argument is not met by anything that was said in either the Birmingham Midshires
case or State Bank of India v. Sood. 13
Mr Dixon suggests that we might read the relevant provisions as “providing a remedy inter se
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between trustee and beneficiary while maintaining the largely unassailable position of a purchaser
relying on overreaching and a properly registered disposition”.14 This suggestion would render most of
section 16 of TOLATA otiose. There is nothing in TOLATA to suggest that a breach of section 6(5),
(6) or (8) operates merely internally between trustee and beneficiary. If that were the effect, the
protection afforded to purchasers of unregistered land in section 16(1) and (2) would be quite
unnecessary. Similarly, in relation to section 8(2); if a breach of the duty to obtain consent operates
merely internally, there is no need for any purchaser protection given by section 16(3)(b). Again, in
relation to section 11(1); if a breach of the duty to consult operates merely internally, there is no need
for any purchaser protection given by section 16(1). Mr Dixon needs to demonstrate how his
proposition can be derived from the provisions of TOLATA. In fact, the whole thrust of section 16 is in
the opposite direction, resting on the assumption that without its protective provisions a purchaser
would be adversely affected by the various breaches which it covers; the bulk of that section cannot
be ignored in order to explain away section 16(7).
In advancing the argument that the relevant provisions operate only internally, Mr Dixon proffers a
concession towards those who might be concerned about the justice of overreaching in operation: “If
we are concerned that beneficiaries could suffer a breach of trust and have no viable remedy (after
all, the trustees usually are worthless defendants), one solution might be that a purchaser of a
registered title (even though having relied on *Conv. 224 overreaching) could be liable if, but only if,
that purchaser knowingly assisted in the breach of trust or knowingly received property in breach of
trust.” 15 That suggestion surely cannot be correct. If overreaching occurs under a trust of land then
section 2 of the Law of Property Act 1925 operates. That section protects “a purchaser of a legal
estate in land … whether or not he has notice …” “Purchaser”, for this purpose, is defined as “a
person who acquires an interest in or charge on property for money or money's worth”, i.e. there is no
requirement of good faith.16 We must assume that provisions in the property legislation of 1925 “were
drafted with the utmost care, and their wording, certainly where this is apparently clear, has to be
accorded firm respect”.17 Accordingly, the absence of a requirement of good faith in the relevant
definition of a purchaser is taken to indicate a legislative intention that good faith is not required.18 As
to the meaning of “notice”, from the effect of which section 2 protects the purchaser, that must be
read as comprising actual, imputed and constructive notice.19 It follows from all of this that, where
section 2 applies and overreaching operates, there is no room for any personal liability imposed upon
a purchaser as a result of knowingly receiving trust property,20 nor, we suspect, in the absence of
clear fraud, for dishonest assistance in a breach of trust.21 In this context, “it is not fraud to rely on
legal rights conferred by Act of Parliament”,22 and the courts have refused to allow claimants to avoid
the consequences of the 1925 legislation by means of alternative sources of personal or proprietary
liabil *Conv. 225 ity.23 It is true that the effect on an equitable owner of the doctrine of overreaching
can be harsh, even devastating, but Parliament has not thought fit to limit its effect.24 In the face of
that legislative policy Mr Dixon's suggestion cannot be sustained.
This leaves us with Mr Dixon's third line of argument. This argument accepts the possibility that there
are breaches of trust which preclude overreaching. Prior to TOLATA such breaches were those
known as ultra vires breaches of trust, which, in the context of the pre-1997 law, meant those
transactions which were neither sales nor authorised by section 28 of the Law of Property Act 1925.
Quite correctly Mr Dixon states25 : “… there is no necessary correlation between a breach of trust and
a disposition being ultra vires so as to destroy overreaching and registration … all ultra vires
dispositions are in breach of trust, but it does not follow that all dispositions in breach of trust are ultra
vires. ” We accept that completely, in the sense that it is impossible to postulate any logical
congruence of the terms “breach of trust” and “ ultra vires ”. But that was never our position. We
attempted to deduce from the terms and structure of TOLATA which, if any, breaches of trust would
preclude a disposition from having an overreaching effect. Mr Dixon may think that our deductions are
wrong, but if so he needs to explain how, and why, by reference to the precise provisions of TOLATA.
Briefly, our position can be summarised as follows. A breach of trust that constitutes a breach of the
terms of section 6(5), (6) or (8) is, in the absence of purchaser protection against that breach, a
breach of trust that prevents overreaching from occurring.26 The *Conv. 226 failure of TOLATA to
extend its protective provisions to purchasers of registered land with respect to those provisions limits
the effectiveness of overreaching in registered land after 1997. The situation is different with respect
to a breach of trust that constitutes a breach of section 9 of TOLATA, or a breach of a provision made
by the settlor that the consent of three people is required before a disposition is made.27 A delegation
purporting to be authorised by section 9(1), and a disposition made, contrary to the settlor's
directions, with the consent of two people, are prima facie capable of precluding overreaching,28 but a
purchaser of registered land is able to shelter behind the same protective provisions as a purchaser
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of unregistered land.29 There is no inexorable logic determining when statute will shield a purchaser of
registered land from the consequences of a breach of TOLATA, nor, as far as we can see, are there
any general principles operating. We are faced simply with a list, derived from the very terms of
TOLATA itself, of those breaches of trust which will preclude overreaching in the case of registered
land, and those which will not.
Prior to 1997 the basic structure of the law was coherent: whenever trustees for sale effected a
disposition of a legal estate that was permitted by their powers, section 2 of the Law of Property Act
1925 was activated, and the equitable interests would be overreached provided that any capital
money that arose was paid to no fewer than two trustees. It was generally accepted that this applied
to both unregistered and registered land, and that assumption was confirmed by Flegg. Before 1997 a
purchaser taking under a disposition that was ultra vires could not take advantage of the provisions of
section 2 of the Law of Property Act 1925; after 1997 a purchaser taking under a disposition made in
breach of sections 6, 8 or 11 of TOLATA cannot take advantage of the provisions of section 2 of the
1925 Act. We have no wish to argue that TOLATA “dismantle[d] one of the cornerstones of the 1925
legislation”.30 We simply argue that, if overreaching is a function of the powers of the trustees, then a
structural change to the regime governing those powers will have an effect on the operation of
overreaching. We have sought to deduce the nature of any such effect within the provisions of
TOLATA, because it *Conv. 227 was Part 1 of that Act which made the change of regime governing
trustees' powers.
There remains one final strand to Mr Dixon's defence of Flegg. He writes that “The implications of this
[the Ferris/Battersby] analysis for institutional lenders … need no emphasis”31 and “… if TOLATA is
held to have made this substantive change in the law of overreaching, and thereby to have undercut
current mortgage lending practice …”, the law will be promptly changed by statute.32 In these
circumstances, “it will take a very considerable leap of judicial imagination to conclude that TOLATA
was ever intended to limit overreaching in registered land”.33 We have never argued that the changes
to the law introduced by TOLATA were intended to limit the operation of overreaching in registered
land; on the contrary, we have always argued that the effect was probably inadvertent.34 Nonetheless,
we remain persuaded that this has been the baleful effect of the statute, largely owing to the impact of
section 16(7). That subsection, in denying purchaser protection to purchasers of registered land, is a
more sophisticated version of the fallacy which underlies section 3 of the Law of Property (Joint
Tenants) Act 1964. It is the product of legislative error, and can be rectified only by amending
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